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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM JAMES ASHTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 48437-2020 & 48438-2020
Shoshone County Case Nos.
CR40-18-1503 & CR-2015-60

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Ashton failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
revoked his probation and imposed concurrent sentences of four years with two years determinate
upon his convictions for possession of methamphetamine?
ARGUMENT
Ashton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Police found methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Ashton’s car during the course of a

traffic stop.

(48438 R., pp. 18-20.)

The state charged Ashton with possession of

methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia. (48438 R., pp. 57-58.) Aston pled guilty to
1

possession of methamphetamine as part of a plea agreement. (48438 R., pp. 53, 68.) The district
court imposed a suspended sentence of four years with two years determinate and ordered a period
of two years probation. (48438 R., pp. 67-72.)
Ashton did not report for probation supervision. (48438 R., pp. 83-84.) He was brought
back before the district court after being absent for over three years when the state charged him
with possession of methamphetamine and possession of paraphernalia after police found him in
possession of loaded syringes. (48437 R., pp. 12-13, 59-60.) Ashton admitted violating his
probation and pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine. (48437 R., p. 89; 48438 R., p. 99;
1/9/19 Tr., p. 5, L. 13 – p. 10, L. 15.) The district court revoked probation and executed the original
sentence and imposed a concurrent sentence of four years with two years determinate on the new
conviction. (48437 R., pp. 107-11; 48438 R., pp. 115-16; 11/4/20 Tr., p. 16, L. 18 – p. 17, L. 6.)
Ashton filed notice of appeal timely from the district court’s judgments. (48437 R., pp. 99-101;
48438 R., pp. 107-09.)
On appeal Ashton “contends the district court abused its discretion in both cases
considering the substantial mitigating factors that exist.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 1.) Review of the
record shows no abuse of sentencing discretion.
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). “Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
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whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State
v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
C.

Ashton Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895-96, 392
P.3d at 1236-37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
At sentencing the district court considered the goals of protecting society, deterrence,
punishment and rehabilitation. (11/4/20 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 8-14.) It reviewed the materials submitted
for sentencing. (11/4/20 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 15-19.) The district court specifically recognized the legal
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“preference” for probation, but found that overridden by Ashton’s criminal record and the fact
Ashton had already absconded once and refused to turn himself in. (11/4/20 Tr., p. 15, L. 3 – p.
16, L. 1; p. 17, Ls. 14-18.) The “most mitigating” factor Ashton presented was his desire to parent
his son. (11/4/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-16.) The district court rejected retained jurisdiction because
that would not be a good use of resources given Ashton’s history. (11/4/20 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-10.)
The record supports the district court’s exercise of discretion. Ashton has an extensive
criminal history dating back to at least 1997 and including multiple opportunities to rehabilitate
under supervision. (PSI, pp. 3-5, 10-16. 1) The convictions in this case are, respectively, Ashton’s
fifth and sixth felony convictions. (See PSI, p. 16.) While on probation in the initial case Ashton
moved out of state and repeatedly refused any cooperation with his probation officer. (PSI, p. 5.)
As set forth above in more detail, Ashton had been absconded from probation for three years when
he committed the latest felony. The district court’s sentences and rejection of probation and
retained jurisdiction were reasonable and well within its discretion.
Ashton has failed to show an abuse of discretion. He first argues that he successfully
completed probation in Washington while he was absconded from probation in Idaho, and was
therefore successfully rehabilitated. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (citing 11/4/20 p. 11, Ls. 6-10, 1620).) Although Ashton’s counsel made this claim at sentencing, there is no evidence in the record
to support it. The PSI reports a Washington probation imposed in 2002 and a probation violation
in Washington in 2013 (PSI, p. 15), but does not have any information on any probation in
Washington at any time relevant to this case.

Moreover, Ashton’s claims that he lived

continuously in the same house in Spokane are contradicted by his statements to the presentence
investigator that he was living in Montana. (PSI, p. 3.) Moreover, when his probation officer sent

1

All citations to the PSI are to the electronic file containing the March 23, 2019 update.
4

a letter to Ashton in Spokane it was returned as undeliverable. (PSI, p. 5.) This claim, unsupported
by any evidence, and even if true, does not show an abuse of discretion.
Ashton next argues that the presentence investigator recommended retained jurisdiction.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) The district court, however, concluded that it did not need further
evaluation to conclude that Ashton was not a suitable candidate for another probation. (11/4/20
Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-10.) The district court therefore properly exercised its discretion. See State v.
Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676, 115 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The primary purpose of the
retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to gain additional information regarding
the defendant's rehabilitative potential and suitability for probation.”).
Finally, Ashton asserts he had good reasons for absconding from probation. (Appellant’s
brief, p. 5.) The district court specifically rejected those reasons as grounds for a lesser sentence.
(11/4/20 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 14-19; p. 17, Ls. 14-18.)
Ashton has failed to show an abuse of discretion. The district court’s sentence is supported
by the record and is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 29th day of October, 2021.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of October, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us
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/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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